## INTELLOFAX 17

Approved For Release 1999/09/09 CIA-RDP82-00457 STEPSEATION

CHANNEY 115.05.1.6

NO. OF PAGES 2 Smuggling in Vientiene Activities of Fao Oon and Vichien Muangkhot

25X1A2g

LACE

25X1A6a ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

25X1X6

DATE OF INFO.

April 1950

indochina

en euro

Vientiane is in a poor economic position and the cost of living is high. Smuggling goods from Thailand to Vientiane is not difficult, however, if the right contact is made. The cost for smuggling a bicycle, for example, is only 20 to 30 ticals, and a guarantee is given that it will arrive at its destination. In addition to air travel, there are two ways of reaching Vientiane from Thailand. The best route is to cross the Mekong River at Nong Khai to Tha Dua, 30 kilometers from Vientiane. A bus from Tha Dua to Vientiane takes one hour. The second route is from Ban Srichiengmal, about 30 kilometers from Nong Khai, crossing the river directly to Vientiane. However, this route takes longer because of the poor motor road from Nong Khaito Ban Srichiengmai.

- Although the French have allowed the Lactians to administer their own government, they have retained control of the Military and Finance Ministries. According to Tao Oon, the French have promised to place the army directly under Lao control in the near future. In that event, Tao Oon feels that he will receive the post of Commander of the Army. It is doubtful, however, that such a change in command will occur.
- The Laos Parliament consists of thirty members, of whom nine form the opposition. There are three members of Parliament from Vientiane.
- The lack of cooperation between such Laos leaders as Tao Oon and Sin seems to indicate that the French policy in Laos 1s to create dissension between the Lactian leaders, inducing them to compete with one another. Prominent inotians are all afraid of the Viet Minh, and feel that some time in the Enture the Viet Minh will probably control Laos. However, there is no evidence that there is any relation between the Viet Minh and Lactian leaders, who feel that they receive better treatment from the French than from the fiet Minh. The Lactian people themselves are completely obedient to their leaders and appear to have no active initiative.
- The French are suspicious of all strangers in Vientiane and make an immedi: te check on new entrants who arouse their interest. the French are still watching him closely. 25X1X6

25X1X6

PONITION NOT THE 

	CLASSIFICATION	C NEIDENTIAL CON	TROL - U.S	. OFFICIALS (	NLY	
STATE # X NAVY	NSRB	NSRB DISTRIBUTION		-		
ARMY AIR	₩ FBi					
Approved I	CONFIGURE NETIAL in letter of 15 Cot Director of Central Archivist of the 1 Next Review Date	s hereby regraded to accordance with the lober 1978 from the statelligence to the United States. e: 2008	Class. Sha Auth.: HR	sified to: To	s c	

## Approved For Release 1999/09/09 : CIA-RDP82-00457R005000010004-5 CONFIDENTIAL

CONTIDENTIAL/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S0-40683

- 2 -

- B-3 7. On approximately 17 April 1950, Vichien Muangkhot\* approached Tao Oon, through the Lord Mayor of Nong Khai, asking him to secure French permission for his safe return to Laos. Tao Oon refused, fearing that the French, who consider Vichien dangerous and unreliable, would not only refuse but would support Tao of collaboration with Vichien.
  - Comment. Lt. Gen. Vichien Muangkhot is the former commander of the Free Lacs forces. When his funds were exhausted he turned first to the Thai Government and then to the Chinese Communists for support. The Communists appeared willing to work with him only if he were successful in constructing a secret airstrip along the northern Thai border. It is known that Vichien did not go north on this mission when he originally planned. He may have been restrained from doing so by the Thai Government, with which he was in contact, or for other reasons. It now appears that Vichien has been inactive for the past few months, that he is at the end of his resources, and wants to return to Lacs. The Viet Minh, who reportedly have the support of Prince Souphanavong, probably feel they do not need Vichien. Furthermore, since Viet Minh troops have fought on occasion with those of Vichien, it is likely that real cooperation between the two is impossible.

CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY